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ABSTRACT 
Southern countries are undergoing a severe economic crisis that has renewed 
debates about the available strategies to economize their public resources. 
Political leaders have launched a wide range of different strategies aimed at 
reducing spending. According to generally accepted political discourse, drastic 
actions should be taken to guarantee economic and financial sustainability in 
times of austerity. 
We explore the main measures adopted by Spanish municipalities in order to 
examine their impact in budgetary terms. First of all, we identify the most 
frequently implemented mechanisms including organizational structure, public 
services and operational economic restructuration. After their quantification, we 
monitor the presence and impact of each set of policies to analyse the relationship 
between concrete measures and effective economic impact. 
The effective reduction of budgets is being implemented but data shows that local 
governments are resilient to non-compulsory changes. The ‘government at a 
distance’ policy pursued by the central state administration has effectively 
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reduced budgets but has not affected the institutional core of Spanish local 
governments. 
Keywords: austerity measures; economic crisis; local government resilience; 
local restructuration. 
1. Introduction 
Europe and particularly the southern countries are undergoing a severe economic crisis 
that has renewed debates about the available strategies to economize their public 
resources in order to reduce the deficit. Pushed by the European Commission, the IMF 
FMI and the European Central Bank, some of the southern European Member States 
have promoted policies of austerity and spending cuts at the local level (Di Mascio & 
Natalini, 2015). In some cases, these fiscal policies have attempted a profound 
transformation of the municipal structure and organization (Greece, Italy). However, in 
other cases (such as Spain and France) the basis of the municipal structure remains 
untouched in exchange for the incorporation of economies of scale into public service 
management, and the imperative to reduce public debt and to implement effective 
budget equilibrium. Under this framework, an explanation of how, and with what 
effects, budget cuts at the local level are undertaken gains special relevance. A basic 
understanding of the effects of this new fiscal situation imposed from upper-tier 
governments on local structures is the main purpose of this work. 
 
Even if local governments are not the main source of public debt and fiscal stress in 
Europe, central and regional governments have required them to commit to reducing 
costs and implementing measures to reduce their public expenditures.  
 
In Spain in 2011, after three years of public budget instability in the very heart of the 
financial crisis, fiscal austerity achieved constitutional status when the amendment of 
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Article 135 of the Spanish Constitution placed budget stability and the repayment of 
loans subject to debt interest as constitutional priorities. This constitutional protection of 
austerity gave birth to several laws devoted to fiscal austerity and budget stability, 
which affected all public institutions. Since then, two main bills that affect local 
finances were passed with the objective of addressing the structural reforms demanded 
by the EU mainly through the approval of Law 2 /2012, of 27 April, on Budget Stability 
and Financial Sustainability, and the LRSAL (Law 27/2013, of 27 December), which is 
a reform of the Local Act amending the legal framework established by Law 7/1985. 
The Spanish case is extremely interesting because reforms are mainly driven by 
introducing restrictions on local finances rather than by structural reorganization, as is 
the case in Greece, Portugal and Italy. 
  
The institutional position of Spanish local governments in the political system is 
characterized by their belonging to the so-called ‘Franco or Napoleonic’ group of local 
governments, mainly located in the south of Europe (Heinelt & Hlepas, 2006). This 
group of local government systems is characterized by a high level of political 
autonomy and elite bargaining capabilities, but with lo  functionality —which is to say, 
low performance in terms of output production (John, 2001; Page & Goldsmith, 1987; 
Wolman & Goldsmith, 1992). This southern group, originally formed by Spain, France, 
Greece and Portugal, seems to cling mostly to the idea of a strong local representative 
elite and a centralized bureaucracy. The political expression of local autonomy, together 
with the generalized lack of capabilities and resources, faces us with a constellation of 
strong political institutions with narrow margins for real manoeuvre, and with low or 
very moderate economic impact in aggregate terms. By contrast with the ‘Northern-
Middle European’ typology, local governments in Southern Europe have neither the 
opportunity to increase their income by levying and increasing their own taxes nor the 
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possibility of determining substantially which tasks have to be fulfilled, because they 
are very financially dependent on regional or central government.  
 
Due to the unprecedented gravity of the economic crisis, local governments have been 
subjected to political pressure, coming mainly from the central state, to place budget 
reductions and fiscal consolidation at the top of their agendas. Therefore, mayors and 
local staff have begun a race against budget imbalances that are blamed on excessive 
spending. This political pressure has promoted municipal savings on public budgets, 
achieving an average spending reduction of 459 euros per capita in Catalan local 
governments from 2009 to 2013, according to our data.  
 
The main objective of this article is to understand the impact of the austerity measures 
implemented by the sole will of local authorities in their budgets. For tackling this 
objective, we firstly identify the concrete measures undertaken by a large sample of 
local governments in Spain in order to, secondly, test the concrete impact of the 
implemented measures on local budgets. Therefore, this article aims to identify and 
classify the concrete measures implemented, on the one hand, and whether they have 
had an impact in budgetary terms and under what conditions, on the other. Moreover, 
the research on budget decisions links naturally to organizational impact and 
institutional design since local institutions modify and restructure their functions by 
changing their budget priorities.   
 
To test the existent relation (if any) of implemented austerity measures in local budgets, 
we build an ‘Austerity Measures Index’ (AMI) as an instrumental variable in order to 
quantify and equalize the concrete measures implemented at the local level and to test 
their impact on public budgets. Taking Catalan local governments as a case study, we 
want to make an empirical assessment of the real impact of austerity measures on local 
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budgets. Catalan municipalities are a good testing ground for Spanish and Southern 
European municipalities since they fulfil all of the characteristics belonging to the 
‘Franco type’, widely described in the literature.  
 
The article is organized as follows. Following this introduction, we briefly present the 
basic literature regarding crisis and expenditure patterns in local governments. The third 
section presents the research question and its translation into two main hypotheses for 
testing, together with a presentation of the data and methodology for building our AMI. 
The fourth section is based on descriptive statistics and it identifies the most frequently 
implemented mechanisms on structure, reorganization of the public services (both from 
the input, as well as the output perspective), and operational economic restructuration. 
The fifth section presents the main results based on the determinants of our AMI, and 
the relations between our index and the effective budget impact. We finally present a 
discussion and some brief conclusions. 
 
2. Local budgets and austerity measures in times of fiscal crisis 
A wide range of theoretical elements needs to be considered in respect of the 
introduction of austerity measures at the local level. First, it is useful to address some 
general ideas concerning the concept of crisis and its implications. If crisis is conceived 
as a moment of transformation and decisive political intervention (Hay, 1999, 2013), we 
also need to consider some elements related to the existing theory on cutback 
management and austerity measures. In a second step, for a complete empirical 
assessment of the impact of economic crisis and austerity in local governments, we need 
to take into account elements coming from the institutional and organizational structure 
of municipalities, together with cutback management, and contextual elements that 
shape local structures (Overmans & Timm-Arnold, 2015). 
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There is no dominant concept to be found when defining crisis (Orr, 2009). Some 
authors describe the concept of crisis as one of the most undeveloped concepts in social 
and political theory (Hay, 1999; Orr, 2009). However, it is possible to identify it as a 
moment (or a continuity of moments) in which a decisive intervention is made in order 
to redress organizational dysfunctionalities. This capability to redress critical situations 
differs along an ideal continuum that has ‘dynamic and proactive systems’ (based on 
organizational learning and ability for managing change and self-transformation) at one 
extreme, and ‘inertial and re-active systems’ at the other (Hay, 1999). This is to say, 
reactions to these stressing situations for public organizations of all levels vary among 
‘denying or delaying cuts’ or ‘implementing cuts’ as instruments, and strategic or ‘equal 
misery’ approaches to solve problems, the literature already accounting in different 
manners for such basic distinction (Overmans & Noordegraaf, 2014; Pollitt, 2010; 
Raudla, Savi, & Randma-Liiv, 2013) 
 
Therefore, we can identify systemic versus conjectural austerity strategies at any 
governmental level. The former can be conceived as a response to systemic failures, 
where institutions are fundamentally transformed. The latter is a response to systemic 
failure in which a solution is sought within the pre-existing and unmodified structures 
(Hay, 1999). This is to say, we can easily differentiate between strategies that affect core 
functions of political institutions, from superficial strategies that rely on minor or 
cosmetic changes. In general terms, Hay (1999) offers four strategic responses that can 
be categorically classified, from stronger to lighter: 
a. Responses to resolve the failures in their totality. 
b. Responses to resolve selective contradictions and failures. 
c. Responses to resolve the narrative of the crisis. 
d. Purely discursive responses. 
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Applied specifically to the local level, these four categories of strategic responses to the 
‘symptoms’ of crisis imply different institutional effects. The first is almost impossible 
to observe at the local level, as local governments are mostly ‘creatures of the state’. 
This institutional position practically implies their lack of capacity to implement 
effective measures to solve the totality of the crisis. In the same line, Pollit (2010) 
argues that highly fragmented systems may find it more difficult to undertake overall 
strategies. Generally, local governments’ responses imply dealing with decisions from 
the upper tiers of government. So, theoretically, when facing local governments’ 
decisions on austerity measures and crisis symptoms, our theoretical expectations would 
seem to range from responses basically to fight against the narrative of the crisis, 
through symbolic and discursive decisions, to purely discursive responses, rather than 
addressing structural cutbacks, as it has also been pointed out in Overmans and 
Noordegraaf (2014). In any case, austerity management can be defined as: ‘executive 
and managerial responses, aimed at restoring the fiscal balance, against the background 
of increasing demands for [public] services and [political and public] expectations of 
organizational performance’ (Overmans & Noordegraaf, 2014, p. 101).  
 
Linked with these possible responses to fight against economic crises, considerable 
discussion has recently taken place about the resilience of local governments and their 
ability to adapt in a changing environment (Lowndes & McCaughie, 2013; Shaw, 2012). 
Assuming this new trend, resilience can be viewed as the ability to change rather than 
the ability to continue doing the same thing (Shaw, 2012). Under this approach, local 
governments are, by nature, the more flexible and innovative institutions with clear 
strategic leadership and the ability to change and to adapt. So, together with the 
austerity strategies, the introduction of austerity measures at the local level can also be 
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analysed as a ‘resilience strategy’ where budget cuts might be addressed but with a view 
to change within institutional preservation. 
 
2.1 The politics of austerity in troubled times 
 
In an era of permanent austerity (Pollitt, 2010), the question of dealing with 
management cutbacks in public organizations is at the forefront of most organizations 
and practitioners. Therefore, a growing interest in understanding and classifying 
responses to financial crisis appears. We summarize in this section the main vectors of 
classification for austerity measures, together with their implications in organizational 
terms. Recent reviews from Raudla et al. (2013) and Overmans and Noordegraaf (2014) 
summarize the main findings related to cutback strategies, patterns of cutting 
expenditures and the changes occurring in decision-making processes of public 
organizations.  
 
For cutback strategies, a usual dichotomization of the main possibilities appears in 
Raudla et al. (2013): ‘across the board’ versus ‘targeted cuts’ reveals the main divide. In 
fact, this is a classic distinction that is generated in function of the impact of decisions 
on budgets and services: where a strategic approach is put forward on ‘targeted cuts’, 
and an ‘equal misery’ decisional approach is emphasized on ‘across the board’ or 
salami-slicing decisions. Concerning the instruments to implement cuts, the theoretical 
variety being wide, again Raudla et al. (2013) establish a tripartite taxonomy: 
instruments for cutting operational measures (running costs), programme measures 
(transfers and grants) and capital expenditures (investments). Inside each category, they 
identify a large typology of concreate measures, ranging from cutting personnel to 
laying off personnel in cutting running costs; to reduction of capital expenditures and 
reducing cost services provision for programme measures and investments. Finally, they 
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depict how these cutback strategies and instruments run into organizational effects. 
They argue that changes in public management practices reflect the need to adapt 
internally and externally to the environment, emphasizing the centralizing tendencies, 
but also the local resilience, in the relations between national and local government 
(Raudla et al., 2013, p. 28). 
 
Overmans and Noordegraaf (2014) offer a theoretical model elegantly built on two 
dimensional axes to analyse both the effects and types of austerity measures. They argue 
that managing austerity can mainly be analysed through a continuum of two 
independent axes: one axis is focused on the stability (superficial reduction) or change 
(proactive and long-term viability) of the organization, while the other focuses on the 
type of measures, being purely fiscal or affecting organization structures and systems. 
This theoretical model opens up into a two-by-two table, for theoretically generating 
four different types of responses to austerity: Decline, Cutbacks, Retrenchment and 
Downsizing. 
 
In their work, Overmans and Noordegraaf (2014) identify Decline as a kind of 
organizational measure showing a passive managerial reaction, primarily focused on 
stability: ending policies, reducing levels of maintenance, decreasing support, among 
others. Cutbacks are also focused on stability, but include fiscal measures, such as 
cheese slicing cuts or cuts-across-the board, with the objective of driving the 
organization to lower levels of resource consumption and lowering activities. 
Retrenchment is a proactive response mainly focused on fiscal change and it may 
include measures such as raising fees and taxes or adjusting actuarial rates. Finally, 
Downsizing is described as a ‘strategy for improving organizational performance and 
restoring organizational-environmental fit’, and may include measures such as 
optimizing work processes and costs or organizational efficiency. Although a clear 
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conceptual divide emerged from these four possibilities, this classification should be 
considered ‘as a continuum rather than completely separate categories’ (Overmans & 
Timm-Arnold, 2015, p. 7), because usually measures combine several objectives and 
instruments.  
 
Summing up, an intention can always be found when applying austerity measures, and 
there is usually some room for manoeuvre when it comes to managing austerity 
measures at any political level. Most of the time, the choices to be made involve a 
strategic way of reasoning, since we have to retain the fact that local responses to crisis 
and austerity are mediated by politics, since local elected politicians need to solve a 
permanent tension between cutbacks and public service provision.     
  
As we have established, management cutbacks in public organizations are a 
consolidated topic of research, nevertheless, recent interest is growing in the 
relationship between local governments and austerity measures at the local level. In fact, 
municipalities appear as an important site from which to explore crisis and institutional 
change (Cepiku, Mussari, & Giordano, 2016; Keller, 2014; Orr, 2009; Overmans & 
Noordegraaf, 2014) mainly because local institutions are extremely sensitive to direct 
expressions of crisis given their proximity to citizens and communities. Indeed, the 
subnational level allows better comparability as politico-administrative variables and 
legal restrictions operate in a homogeneous way in every country or region considered, 
with potentially large-N units analysis.  
 
2.2 Austerity measures at the local level: specificities and context. 
 
If management literature has treated vastly the question of classifying and evaluating 
austerity measures, less attention has been devoted to their effective implementation and 
Page 10 of 36
URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/flgs  Email: lgs@contacts.bham.ac.uk
Local Government Studies
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review Only
11 
impact at the local level. Most of the works are based on states and regions and, 
specifically to municipalities, mainly in US cities – and to a less extent UK cities 
(Overmans & Noordegraaf, 2014, p. 103; Raudla et al., 2013, pp. 4, 39 and appendix for 
a detailed summary). Some recent studies treat European municipalities, with small 
samples of cities being observed in detailed case-studies, but mainly addressed to a 
better understanding of the types of measures and the determinants of their choice 
(Cepiku et al., 2016; Keller, 2014; Ladner & Soguel, 2015; Overmans & Noordegraaf, 
2014; Overmans & Timm-Arnold, 2015).  
 
These seminal works, together with other related literature, offer a basic understanding 
of the variables potentially affecting austerity measures at the local level. However, not 
sufficient straightforward evidences are available when analysing local governments’ 
behaviour in managing austerity (Cepiku et al., 2016, p. 229; Raudla et al., 2013, pp. 9, 
30, 39). In fact, Overmans and Timm-Arnold (2015) clearly state that their findings ‘do 
not support the concept of universal austerity plans. Instead, they indicate a relation 
between the institutional system and the deployed responses’. Therefore, a large effect 
of institutional and contextual factors is present when analysing local governments in 
austerity times. Most of the variables related to the political-administrative system relate 
to socio-economic forces, financial situation, strength of the executives and others 
related to the administrative culture (or structure) (Overmans & Timm-Arnold, 2015, 
pp. 3 to 5). 
 
Since public budgeting is the process of macro-allocation of resources coming from the 
central state, at the local level we are facing a process of micro-allocation where tough 
choices must be made among a huge number of competing programmes. There is also at 
the local level a general tendency to accept the allocation of the previous year as a 
given, and to examine changes from that allocation: ‘the budgetary process itself 
Page 11 of 36
URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/flgs  Email: lgs@contacts.bham.ac.uk
Local Government Studies
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review Only
12 
appears to push toward incrementalist outcomes, even in economic environments that 
appear to call for “rational decrementalism”’ (Peters, 2010). Indeed, when turning 
attention to the specific field of public budgeting, it is widely accepted that ‘There are 
striking regularities in the budgetary process’ (Davis, Dempster, & Wildavsky, 1966). 
These regularities are based on the fact that a given budget approved in year t is highly 
dependent on the one approved in year t-1 (Natchez & Bupp, 1973). In fact, the 
fundamental factors in the budgetary process tend to work along the lines of incremental 
outcomes; first, in terms of the technical and sheer magnitude of the process itself and, 
second, in the sequential and repetitive nature of budgeting. In this sense, our approach 
to budget change is rather simple: we understand change as the increase or decrease in 
the budget of our localities.  
 
Regarding the ability to manipulate public spending, the capacity of incumbents in local 
governments for introducing cycles on local budgets has been widely accepted (for an 
intensive review see Benito, Bastida & Vicente, 2013). From this assumption, 
incumbents manipulate economic activity in order to increase their chances of being re-
elected. Cycles are strongly related to elections. Usually, the opportunistic behaviour of 
incumbents appears when government spending increases, deficits increase, or tax cuts 
are implemented before elections. 
  
Thus, under conditions of extreme austerity and social cuts, an ideological explanation 
for the implementation, or not, of austerity decisions might also be plausible. The 
ideological dimension is easily captured by the left-right scale that offers a progressive 
and redistributive view of the role of the state against a more conservative and market 
oriented state outlook. This left-right scale taps into economic issues associated with the 
redistribution of wealth, taxing and spending, and the role of the state in the economy, 
and has been used in previous studies (Karyotis, Rüdig & Judge, 2014; Overmans & 
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Noordegraaf, 2014, p. 103; Raudla et al., 2013, pp. 20–21). However, it has never been 
proved as a clear predictor of almost any municipal behaviour, especially regarding 
economic issues (Bastida, Beyaert & Benito , 2012; Benito, Bastida & García, 2010). In 
any case, as the austerity programme launched by the Spanish government was backed 
and designed by the conservative parties, we have considered that this might be a 
relevant factor in explaining the differences in the number of measures implemented. 
  
In addition to the form of government and its implications, there is also a growing 
literature, linking expenditure and type of government, typically, majority vs coalition 
governments (Bastida et al., 2012). These approaches indicate that majority 
governments tend to fall into lower levels of debt and, therefore, better control 
spending. Indeed, given that in any quasi-parliamentary system political and party 
performance is characterized by a strong alignment of votes between party leaders and 
elected members, we consider that mayors of single party governments, with a higher 
share of elected officials, may face fewer problems in adopting these kinds of measures. 
Therefore, powerful mayors will implement more measures, following the central 
political mood, than less powerful mayors (coalition or minority mayors). 
  
Regarding socio-economic aspects, the economic level of the municipalities, measured 
through average GDP per capita, has also been used as a proxy for the wellness of the 
city (Bastida, Benito & Guillamón, 2009). Unemployment at the municipal level may also 
be considered as a relevant variable, although its impact on budget cuts is far from 
evident. We hypothesize that higher levels of unemployment will lead to lower scores 
on AMI, assuming a sort of ‘protection’ from austerity for vulnerable citizens. 
  
Population and density are also usual control variables in any local government study. 
Population usually matters and, in this case, we wanted to explore if it really does 
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matter and, if so, how. The general assumption of the impact of population presumes 
that large cities, with a higher budget and greater room for manoeuvre, may adopt more 
austerity measures. Density is a predictor for the existence of economies of scale, 
making it easy to reduce costs or increase savings. Moreover, a mayor of a large city can 
easily apply more austerity measures as he/she is more distant from the citizens than is 
the case in small or medium local government. 
 
3. Hypotheses and data 
To answer our two basic objectives (identification of austerity measures, and their 
impact in budgetary terms) we provide two types of evidence. On the one hand, we 
offer in section four a detailed panoply of the austerity measures implemented by 
Catalan local governments, together with their operationalization through AMI. On the 
other hand, in section five, we address the question of their economic impact in local 
budgets. 
 
Given the decremental reality of the budgets of local governments in Catalonia, we want 
to test two simple hypotheses concerning the second objective. The first aims to identify 
the basic determinants of the implementation of austerity measures at the local level: 
Under what conditions do local governments implement austerity measures? The second 
hypothesis aims to test the impact of those austerity measures on local budgets. The 
concrete formulation of the hypotheses is as follows: 
 
H1. Larger and more complex cities may apply more austerity measures (the 
greater the values of AMI). 
That is to say that the determinants of AMI are related to a group of relevant socio-
political variables (which add complexity to local governance). We attempt to find 
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higher scores of AMI in larger, denser, less politically fragmented, and right-wing cities 
than in others. Since the Franco type typology implies a homogenization of local 
governance, we will focus on H1 in variables that present higher variability across units. 
These variables, and their disparity, are generally conceived as the only ones that allow 
Southern European local governments to differentiate among themselves in relation to 
policy-making. 
 
H2. The higher the score on the AMI, the higher the budget reduction. 
Applying more austerity measures should generate a higher impact in budgetary terms. 
In this case, we are addressing the core assumption of the paper. Does the adoption of 
austerity measures make any difference at all or are they mainly rhetorical? That is to 
say, is it the case that the more measures undertaken (measured from AMI), the greater 
the budget reduction? We must assume that the answer is yes, that the higher the AMI 
score, the deeper the budget cuts at the local level. 
 
3.1. Methodology and timing details 
Given that there is no available official information, in order to study the 
implementation of austerity measures we are using information taken from the Project 
Observatory of Local Government, conducted by the Fundació Carles Pi i Sunyer. All 
Catalan municipalities of more than 500 inhabitants – those with an effective political 
and administrative room of manoeuvre – except Barcelona, are included in the study, for 
a total N=625. The fieldwork was conducted from September to December 2013. As for 
the budget data, we are using data gathered by the Spanish Ministry of Public 
Administration. 
  
As the study was supposed to cover a period of time that includes the situation previous 
to the deepest impact of the economic crisis, the process of decision-making and 
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implementation of measures, and the impact in budgetary terms, three different 
moments, could be identified in the methodological strategy:  
(1) Budget for 2009 (in terms of budget out-turn according to the Spanish public 
accountancy system). This budget was developed in a previous period to the 
implementation of the austerity measures. It could be said that it was still 
configured as a budget within a framework of expansion or the start of 
deceleration but still no stagnation or crisis. We have opted for this precise 
period as it could be considered as the last one prior to the crisis and it offered 
advantages in terms of population equivalences.   
(2) Field work. The questionnaire included questions about the measures 
included in the 2013 budget. 
(3) Budget for 2013 (in terms of budget out-turn according to the Spanish public 
accountancy system). This budget should reflect the impact of the austerity 
measures (available December 2014).  
 
3.2. Operationalization and main variables 
The questionnaire on austerity measures included a group of questions related to their 
implementation, and it was organized following the theoretical impact of every measure 
in the local budget, ranging from structural measures to contingency measures. 
However, we adhere to the Overmans and Noordegraaf classification (2014), since it 
allows to better contrast our results with the theoretical expectations behind every 
measure in the final discussion.  
 
As regards measures responding mainly to ‘cutback’ responses (that is fiscal measures 
of a stable nature), we include:  
- Reduction in the amounts paid for attendance at meetings (compensation of 
expenses) 
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- Reduction in elected members’ salaries 
- Reduction in overtime payments 
- Reduction in representation allowances 
- Changes in Compulsory services: 
- Public street lighting 
- Waste collection 
- Street cleaning 
- Paving and maintenance of streets and roads. 
 
As regards measures relating to Decline (that is to say, with organizational impact and 
tending to stability), we identified:  
- Reduction in the number of civil servants 
- Reduction in the number of other staff members 
- Strategies designed to reduce energy consumption 
- Reductions in funds for investments.   
 
In the category of Retrenchment, that is measures focusing on change and of a fiscal 
nature, we identified changes in all non-compulsory services: 
 - Non-compulsory services 
- Emergency social services 
- Public transportation 
- Housing services 
- Libraries 
- Social and cultural centres, and museums 
- Public sport facilities 
- Childcare 
- Adult education 
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- Music schools. 
 
Finally, in the category of Downsizing, that is to say the determination of a set of 
intentionally and coherent measures, we monitor the existence of a comprehensive 
Austerity Plan in the municipality.  
 
We also included general descriptors of the municipality, including population and 
territory, and political variables such as the political affiliation of the mayor, political 
strength, and the type of government (majority, coalition or minority). We recoded the 
original party affiliation of mayors to a dichotomous left-right variable. We measured 
the strength of government as the percentage share of elected officials belonging to the 
mayoral group among the total of elected officials. Finally, we created a dummy 
variable to capture coalition governments (more than one party) against the others 
(majority and single minority governments), assuming that coalitions face more 
problems to agree on austerity decisions due to the double bargaining process to be 
approved (first in the local executive and then in the city council). To avoid cycles, we 
designed a variable to compare the evolution per inhabitant from 2009 to 2013, as they 
represent two mid-term budgets, otherwise, the gross amount and pre-electoral or post-
electoral budgets would introduce enormous biases.   
 
3.3. Building the Austerity Measures Index (AMI) 
 
In order to work with these variables, we needed to define a mechanism to quantify the 
austerity measures taken by every city council. We opted to operationalize the general 
concept of austerity measures into the proposal for an ‘Austerity Measures Index’ 
(AMI) that allows us to create an aggregative indicator scaling the number and 
relevance of the strategies adopted. 
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AMI is constructed using a calculation based on all the declared austerity measures in 
every local government (from 0 to 24 possible measures). To create a homogeneous 
indicator, the index has been reduced to a 0 to 1 scale and weighted in order to 
distinguish the different impacts of the different measures. The weights respond to the 
need to compensate the different economic impacts that every type of measure has in 
the local budget, since undertaking a reduction in energy consumption is not the same as 
reducing the number of staff members. So, the proposed weights are grounded on the 
average percentage representing each measure in local governments’ budgets over the 
years.  
Measures affecting structure into the long term: all measures weighted 0.4. 
Measures on public services delivery: all included services weighted 0.35. 
Contingency measures: all considered contingency measures weighted 0.25. 
  
Table 1 accounts for their assigned weight and theoretical classification, together with 
their use across municipalities. Our instrumental variable AMI serves us to first, test the 
socio-political determinants of AMI; second, using the index as an independent variable, 
we explore its relation to austerity in local public budgets. Both issues will be addressed 
using OLS regression techniques. 
 
4. Descriptive statistics 
This section shows the large and raw numbers related to the identification and use of 
austerity measures. We show whether local governments have or have not undertaken 
austerity measures in concrete terms, leaving aside the precise type of measure. 
Although we have this information for most of the services, our preliminary aim is to 
detect where (in which services and topics) austerity measures are being implemented. 
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We now present the results of the Survey. Regarding the implementation of all kinds of 
measures, respondents have identified the following actions: 
Table 1 
We comment on the results in Table 1 following the impact of measures on local 
budgets. It shows that, on average, we found austerity measures on structural aspects in 
40% of local governments. Political aspects, such as reductions in salaries of elected 
members and amounts paid for attendance at committees or institutional meetings, were 
reduced in most of the cases (65.1% and 56.1% respectively). These are immediate and 
visible measures that can be easily perceived and understood by citizens. However, in 
budgetary terms, they cannot be especially relevant. Concerning the reduction of staff, it 
is important to notice that the reduction comes mostly from staff members (46.3%) 
rather than civil servants (only 19.2%), the latter being much more difficult to reduce 
because of the life-long nature of their positions. Finally, it was quite unexpected to find 
that only 9.8% (53 out of 563) of local governments in Catalonia decided to implement 
such a general plan. 
Concerning measures on public services, here we expected to find different and wider 
measures as there are some compulsory services by law, and others based mainly on 
local self-government and political will. As for non-compulsory public services, we 
took into account the fact that the levels of service provision may differ, as they are not 
guaranteed by law. The preceding Table 1 shows that the most affected services are, in 
fact, those directed at children, childcare and music schools. 
The final set of measures includes strategies intended to have an immediate impact 
(contingency measures). In general terms, we could say that the number of 
municipalities adopting these kinds of measures is high. Special attention should be 
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given to strategies to reduce energy consumption in that more than 85% of respondents 
answered affirmatively. 
The picture emerging from Table 1 already shows that most of the austerity measures 
are rolling towards stability, and most of them fiscally oriented. Therefore, part of the 
theoretical arguments stating that local governments will tend more naturally towards 
stability and discursive responses may have some room. Indeed, the situation of all 
measures in the theoretical model already indicates a sort of general tendency for 
municipalities to adhere to stable and ‘conservative’ decisions, rather than engaging in 
deep restructuration. We have to enrich, though, this analysis through a more complex 
approach including an aggregative measure, such as AMI.  
Regarding AMI, as it is an aggregated index of the aforementioned austerity measures, 
it is useful to address some basic bivariate statistics to analyse its behaviour. In this 
respect, Table 2 shows the main descriptive information for the AMI, which is scaled 
from 0 to 1. It should be noted that a score of both 0 or 1, although materially possible, 
is highly improbable. The mean is set at 0.377 in a quite close position to the median. 
Table 2 
 
We also launch some bivariate exploratory analyses in order to learn more about our 
variables, especially when related to size and budgetary impact. First, we test the impact 
of population size on the AMI, as it has been empirically shown to be a fundamental 
explanatory variable at the local level. Second, we test the effect of our AMI on the 
change in local budgets from 2009 to 2013. 
 
Figure 1 takes AMI on the vertical axis and population (logged to avoid disrupting 
effects) on the horizontal one. The regression line is the central one, and the external 
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lines represent the 95% confidence interval. The figure clearly shows that there is a 
positive correlation between the increase in AMI and the increase in population. That is 
to say, the AMI is sensitive to the size of the polity in which it is calculated. In order to 
better assess the intensity of this bivariate relation, the results of a simple Pearson 
correlation show a significant and moderate positive correlation between the AMI and 
population (Coef. 0.440; Sig. 0.000; N=393). 
 
Figure 1 
 
Following with the bivariate approach, we analyse the other side of our AMI through 
the main variable we want to explain: change in local budgets. Once stated that there is 
a relation between size and AMI, we explore the relation of AMI and budget change. In 
Figure 2, we run a correlation between the cuts in public spending and the values of 
AMI. The results are quite clear: in a bivariate model there is no clear impact of AMI on 
the decrementalism of local budgets. From this relationship, we are unable to observe a 
pattern of clear decrease in local budgets when more austerity measures are being 
implemented. 
Figure 2 
Although these results of the AMI variable might seem contradictory or conflicting, in 
fact they show that we are facing a strategic institutional choice. Since large 
municipalities have greater responsibility for more aspects of the everyday life of 
citizens, that is to say, they hold more competence, they have more room for manoeuvre 
and for the implementation of austerity measures. However, whether the city is large or 
small does not have a differential impact among municipalities when effective budget 
reduction per capita is considered. The institutional choice made is plausibly linked to 
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strategic reductions in the budget and not responding to the need for effective budget 
reduction, rather than on the political claims associated with the political mood of 
implementing reforms and cuts.    
Finally, Table 3 includes some descriptive statistics about budget information. The 
general pattern is a strong reduction in expenses over four years. The data for 
inhabitants show an average reduction of 459€, representing almost 30% of the mean of 
the value for 2009. 
Table 3 
5. Results 
As politics and policies are not driven in a bivariate world, we launch two OLS 
multivariate regressions in order to test diverse impacts of different sorts of variables. 
Notice that in H1 we use our AMI as the dependent variable, whereas we use the budget 
reduction per habitant from 2009 to 2013 as a dependent variable for H2. 
Regarding H1, we stated that larger and more complex cities might apply more austerity 
measures (the bigger the values of AMI). We run two regression models to assess the 
impact of a first group of socio-economic variables (model 1), and to add political 
variables in model 2. The results are shown in the following tables. 
 
Table 4 
The results of model 1 partially confirm the expected effects of population (logged) 
over AMI when controlling for other socio-demographic elements: the larger the city, 
the higher the score on AMI. Indeed, we find a significant coefficient on ‘Per capita 
debt 2013’, indicating that the financial situation of the municipality has a positive 
impact on the decision to take austerity measures. Model 2 maintains the explanatory 
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power of both variables: population and debt. However, the remainder of the political 
variables are not significant to understanding the scores of AMI. This is to say, austerity 
measures seem to be related to the fiscal situation of the locality, affecting then the 
number and extension of measures implemented.  
The core of this paper intended to test the impact of AMI on budget reduction, therefore 
H2 stated that the higher the score on AMI, the higher the budget reduction. In this case, 
again, we run two regression models to assess the impact of a first group of socio-
economic variables (model 1), and add political variables in a second step (model 2). 
We propose a multivariate model taking into account the combined effects of several 
independent variables on the change of per capita spending from 2009 to 2013, some of 
them not tested up to this point. 
As we want to test the influence of the AMI, we do not take into account other 
independent variables that highly correlate with it, such as population or debt. Instead, 
we make a calculation on the evolution of relevant variables, keeping in mind that our 
dependent variable is the per capita budget evolution from 2009 to 2013, in absolute 
euros. We add some proxy variables to test other aspects of local reality: we take as a 
proxy of local wealth the mean in the revenue tax at the municipal level for 2009. 
Results are shown in the following table. 
 
Table 5 
 
Our results show that for model 1, there is no explanatory variable for the change in 
local budgets: none of the socio-economic variables proposed are shown as statistically 
significant. These results seem to reinforce the idea that cuts are not economically or 
socially driven, but politically determined. Basic socio-economic variables of local 
governments do not seem to guide the implementation of austerity measures. At first 
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sight, the decremental nature of local budgets is not affected by socio-economic 
variables, leaving room to more complex models: this result impels us to add political 
variables to the analysis. 
 
Regarding model 2, which adds political variables, our results show two important 
findings. On the one hand, there is only one statistically significant coefficient: the 
strength of local government, measured as the percentage share of elected officials 
belonging to the mayoral group among the total of elected officials. Nevertheless, its 
impact in real terms is quite modest: each increase in one unit in the strength of 
municipal government (in % of seats belonging to the mayoral group) explains a 
decrease of almost 7 euros per capita in our dependent variable. That is to say, the 
stronger the mayoral support in the council, the deeper the economic cuts can be. On the 
other hand, AMI does not appear as significant in our model. This result seems to 
indicate that we cannot explain the budget cuts from the amount of austerity measures 
implemented by local governments. This data seems to accept the considered null 
hypothesis, thus rejecting the notion that applying more austerity measures generates a 
higher impact in budgetary terms. This result may indicate that we are facing cosmetic 
measures in order to react to general political discourses, rather than addressing 
fundamental changes.  
 
6. Discussion  
One of our objectives was to reflect on the way that local governments face economic 
crisis, using their margins of manoeuvre by implementing austerity measures. Previous 
theoretical studies have shown the difficulty, or impossibility, for local governments to 
address effective responses to systemic crisis. When the full range of theoretical 
responses to crisis was considered (Hay, 1999), we had already circumscribed the local 
potential to fight against crisis mainly by acting against their own narrative, through 
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symbolic and discursive decisions, or with purely discursive responses. Also Overmans 
and Noordgraaf (2014) find similar patterns, since they find that despite political 
ambitions tending to be innovative and modern, municipal executives ‘commonly 
concentrate on safe measures with short-term budgetary wins and minimal public 
opposition’ (p. 105). 
 
In this sense, most of our results confirm these theoretical explanations. Our sample of 
local governments undertook identifiable and concrete austerity measures. However, the 
impact of these measures for understanding the decrementalism of local budgets is far 
from evident. We found that a relevant number of measures were implemented at the 
local level in 2013. We identified a range of different measures and we classified them 
into four basic strategies and assessed their influence depending on their impact on local 
budgets (structural cuts, reductions related to public service delivery, and contingency 
measures). 
  
The empirical strategy of assigning different impact-weights for every single measure 
has also been proved as congruent with previous theoretical explanations. Our empirical 
findings are in line with recent literature on austerity measures of local governments. 
These previous findings (Cepiku et al., 2016; Ladner & Soguel, 2015; Overmans & 
Noordegraaf, 2014; Overmans & Timm-Arnold, 2015) already highlighted that there is 
a tendency to perceive reforms as mere straight cutbacks, provoking mostly 
‘conservative’ reactions in municipal executives without strategic approaches.  
 
Our data seem to confirm that local political elites in Napoleonic models also react, in 
the first instance, by focusing on stability and safe measures, with minimal political 
cost. These results still need to be tested on similar local government systems, but since 
politico-administrative traditions are a strong modulator of elites’ reactions, the 
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homogeneous nature of Napoleonic systems offers chances to find similar results. Our 
study can offer new insights and new methodologies to test the impact of austerity 
measures on a given state or region, and with large-N configurations.    
 
7. Conclusions 
When testing the nature and determinants of AMI, similar ‘conservative’ effects appear. 
The bivariate analysis results show a particular behaviour of AMI: although it increases 
when analysed in relation with city size, it shows no relation to budget reduction. This 
clash of results seems to indicate a pattern of strategic institutional choice: the adoption 
of austerity measures could be mainly rhetorical, as larger cities apply more measures, 
but general impacts on local budgets do not increase with higher values of AMI. 
  
These findings seem to be reinforced by our multivariate analysis. With respect to the 
determinants for implementing more or less austerity measures at the local level (to 
explain AMI values), we found that size and debt are good predictors for the 
implementation of austerity measures. These results are coherent with our bivariate 
analysis and add the idea of the need for more indebted local governments to show more 
political engagement with budget cuts. Moreover, our OLS regression model, devoted to 
explain effective budget reductions per capita, does not provide evidence to consider 
AMI as a relevant variable to understand decrementalism in local budgets. Our results 
in model 2 reject the fact that applying more austerity measures generates a higher 
impact in budgetary terms, showing that implementation at the local level can be mainly 
a discursive response from local elected politicians to economic crisis. 
  
Political claims and empirical data confirm the existence of a reaction from local 
governments when externally obliged to implement budget reductions. However, the 
policy implications are clear: local governments introduce a varied and wide range of 
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measures, but without clear impact in budgetary terms. Nevertheless, budget cuts are 
real but are not determinants to an understanding of institutional change. In other words, 
the selective cuts and measures implemented by local governments seem to cling to the 
basic idea of ‘plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose’. When local governments in 
southern European countries are obliged to react, but are allowed wide room for 
manoeuvre, the changes they propose do not challenge the core functions of local 
institutions, nor do they address drastic changes in organizational performance. Local 
governments react by protecting the institutional hearth, focusing on organizational 
stability, and by throwing out discursive decisions and responses to weather the storm, 
probably waiting for the renaissance. 
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Type of Impact 
Impact weight
AMI
Austerity Measure % Austerity Measure %
Impact weight
AMI
Type of Impact 
Reduction of elected member salaries (N= 504) 65.1 Social care (N= 440) 3.9
Reduction of amounts paid for attendance (N= 497) 56.5 Social emergency services (N= 390) 1.5
Public street lighting (N= 518) 33.4 Transportation (N= 268) 12.7
Waste collection (N= 473) 24.5 Housing (N= 247) 7.7
Street cleaning (N= 527) 18.0 Public libraries (N= 379) 7.9
Paving and maintenance of streets and roads (N= 512) 18.6 Culture (N= 423) 10.4
Reduction in overtime payments (N=491) 52.1 Sports (N= 486) 9.7
Reduction in representation allowances (N=491) 54.2 Childcare (N= 474) 37.1
Adult learning (N= 240) 7.1
Music schools (N= 295) 25.8
Type of Impact 
Impact weight
AMI
Austerity Measure % Austerity Measure %
Impact weight
AMI
Type of Impact 
Reduction in the number of civil servants (N= 543) 19.2 Austerity plan (N= 543) 9.8 0,4 Structural
Reduction in the number of other staff members (N= 542) 46.3
Strategies to reduce energy consumption (N= 491) 85.7
Reductions in funds for investments (N= 491) 51.7
Source: own data. Model adapted from Overmans and Noordegraaf (2014)
Organisational orientation
C
h
a
n
g
e
S
t
a
b
i
l
i
t
y
Fiscal orientation
Table 1.  Classification, % of implementation and impact weight of austerity measures in catalan municipalities 2013 
Downsizing strategy
Retrenchment strategyCutbacks strategy
0,35
Non compulsory 
Public Service
0,4
0,25
Structural
Contingent
Decline strategy
Structural 0,4
Compulsory 
Public services
0,35
Contingent 0,25
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